China is using the anniversary of diplomatic normalization with Japan to sharpen, rather than soften, its dispute with Tokyo over Taiwan.
On September 29, Beijing tied the 54th anniversary of the 1972 China-Japan Joint Statement to a demand that Japan “correct” Taiwan-related remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and return to what Chinese officials called the “origin” of the four political documents governing bilateral relations.2
The move turned a commemorative date into a diplomatic benchmark. Instead of treating the anniversary as an occasion for ritual calls to improve ties, Beijing framed it as proof that Japan has existing political and legal obligations on Taiwan, history and the postwar order. In China’s telling, a reset is possible only if Tokyo shows it remains bound by the language of normalization.4
The message came in two steps. On September 28, Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Takeshi Iwaya, Japan’s former foreign minister and head of a Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade delegation, in Beijing. According to China’s foreign ministry, Wang said Japan must correct the Taiwan-related “erroneous words and deeds” of its leaders and return to the “original aspiration and starting point” of the four China-Japan political documents.1 Xinhua’s English-language report used the same formulation, underscoring that Beijing wanted the message heard beyond the bilateral setting.3
A day later, foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun explicitly linked that demand to the anniversary of the 1972 Joint Statement. Guo said the document established the political foundation for normalization and that issues of history and Taiwan concern the “political basis” of China-Japan relations.2 Xinhua’s Chinese report from the briefing amplified the point, saying Japanese authorities should use concrete actions to return to the starting point of the four political documents.4
Normalization as leverage
Beijing is not citing the 1972 Joint Statement merely as historical background. It is invoking the document as a standing framework for judging Japan’s conduct today. The statement normalized diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Japan. Beijing has long treated it, together with later bilateral documents, as the foundation of Tokyo’s commitments on Taiwan, wartime history and the overall direction of relations.
By foregrounding the anniversary, China is making the dispute less about one leader’s remarks and more about Japan’s fidelity to normalization itself. That framing raises the diplomatic cost for Tokyo. If Japan does not change its language, Beijing can portray the problem not as a policy disagreement, but as a breach of the foundations on which relations were restored.
That is why the phrase “return to the origin” matters. It suggests Beijing sees recent Japanese statements on Taiwan as a departure from the political settlement of 1972. In that narrative, China is not introducing a new condition for better ties. It is demanding that Japan comply with an old one.1
The immediate trigger is Takaichi’s Taiwan-related language, which Chinese and regional reports have linked to a possible Taiwan contingency. Kyodo, carried by The Straits Times, reported that Wang’s meeting with Iwaya came amid a sharp downturn in relations after Takaichi suggested that a Taiwan emergency could constitute a situation affecting Japan’s survival.5
Japanese media also treated the Wang-Iwaya meeting as a marker in the rupture. TBS reported that it was the first official meeting between Wang and a Japanese politician since relations deteriorated following Takaichi’s Taiwan contingency remarks.6 FNN reported that Wang demanded correction of “erroneous words and deeds” over Taiwan, while Iwaya said he wanted bilateral relations to return to their starting point.7
The exchange shows how both sides are using the language of origins, but not necessarily in the same way. For Beijing, the “starting point” means a political baseline that limits how Japan discusses Taiwan. For Japanese interlocutors seeking stabilization, returning to the starting point may mean re-establishing channels and preventing the dispute from consuming the broader relationship.
History and Taiwan are being fused
China’s anniversary messaging also fuses two themes it frequently uses in disputes with Japan: historical responsibility for wartime aggression and restraint on Taiwan. At the September 29 briefing, Guo tied the Joint Statement to both history and the Taiwan question, making clear that Beijing sees them as linked tests of Japan’s political posture.2
That linkage is important. Taiwan is often presented by Beijing as a sovereignty issue and core interest, while history is used to assess whether Japan has properly absorbed the lessons of its militarist past. By joining the two in the context of the 1972 anniversary, China is arguing that Japan’s Taiwan rhetoric cannot be separated from the postwar settlement or the legitimacy of normalization.
The South China Morning Post reported that Wang warned Japan over World War II history during the business delegation’s visit, placing the Taiwan-related rupture within a wider Chinese effort to press Tokyo on memory, security and political trust.8 In this framework, Japanese statements about a Taiwan contingency are not treated as routine security debate. They are cast as signs that Japan may be moving away from the historical and legal boundaries Beijing says were embedded in normalization.
Business channels, political conditions
The choice of Iwaya’s delegation as the venue also matters. The Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade represents a channel long associated with stabilizing economic contact, even when political relations are strained. By delivering the message to a visiting business-oriented delegation, Wang signaled that commercial engagement cannot be insulated from the Taiwan dispute.
Chinese officials appear to be making the same point across multiple meetings. TV Asahi reported that Iwaya met Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng on September 29 and that the Chinese side blamed the chill in ties on Japanese politicians crossing China’s Taiwan “red line.”9 The follow-up reinforced the message that Beijing sees the downturn as politically caused and politically reversible, but only if Japan adjusts its language.
For Tokyo, this complicates the usual playbook of using economic dialogue to stabilize a tense relationship. Beijing is not rejecting contact. It is using contact to restate conditions. The presence of a trade-promotion delegation therefore did not dilute the dispute. It gave Chinese officials a platform to argue that political correction must precede a broader reset.
A narrower path to reset
Beijing’s anniversary strategy narrows the space for ambiguity. By anchoring its demands in the 1972 Joint Statement and the four political documents, China is asking Japan to treat Taiwan-related restraint as part of the inherited architecture of bilateral relations, not as a negotiable response to current pressure.
That does not mean a diplomatic reset is impossible. The Wang-Iwaya meeting, and the subsequent engagement with He, show that channels remain open. But China’s message is that normalization is not simply an event to commemorate. It is a standard to enforce.
The result is a harder test for Japan. To stabilize ties, Tokyo would likely need to reassure Beijing on Taiwan without appearing domestically to retreat under pressure. For China, the anniversary offered a way to frame that reassurance as a return to established commitments rather than a concession. That is the core of Beijing’s current approach: the future of China-Japan diplomacy is being made contingent on who gets to define the meaning of its past.
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