Alamata battle turns Pretoria collapse into regional security test

Ethiopian federal troops and allied pro-government forces appeared to regain Alamata, a strategic town south of Mekelle, on Monday, September 28, after days of renewed fighting that has spread from Tigray into Amhara and Afar. The escalation has exposed the collapse of the Pretoria Agreement as a regional security crisis, not a local flare-up.¹

The claim of control could not be fully verified in real time because communications across much of Tigray remained disrupted. Reuters reported that a pro-government Tigray Peace Force video showed soldiers in Alamata. Two diplomatic sources said the town had fallen, while a third said pro-government forces had entered but full control was not yet clear. A source linked to opposition forces told Reuters they were retreating and expected federal control within hours.¹ Africanews, citing AP reporting, said pro-government forces claimed Alamata and that ACLED had confirmed reports of federal forces seizing the town.² ACLED’s live tracker also recorded on September 27 that Ethiopian National Defense Force units had reportedly seized Alamata in Southern Tigray.³

Alamata matters because it sits near Tigray’s southern border with Amhara on the main approach toward Mekelle. Reuters described it as a supply hub for troops, food and fuel, about 120 kilometers south of Tigray’s capital, that changed hands several times during the 2020-2022 war.¹ Its apparent recapture gives Addis Ababa and allied forces a staging point on the southern axis, but it does not settle the wider contest. Fighting remains active across multiple fronts, including Afar’s Zone 2, Amhara’s Wag Hemra and North Wello areas, and western Tigray near the Tekeze River.³

Fighting spreads beyond Tigray

The renewed war began as a Tigrayan-led offensive after seven opposition and armed groups announced the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival on September 20, with the stated aim of removing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.¹⁰ The coalition includes the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front and other groups.¹⁰ A TPLF spokesman told the Associated Press that the 2022 peace accord was “no longer valid,” a direct political challenge to the Pretoria framework.¹⁰

The military map widened quickly. ACLED reported that Tigrayan forces seized the Mekelle, Aksum and Shire airports on September 23, opening fronts at Kobo-Tumuga, Zata-Dinqa-Sekota and Tonsa, while fighting continued in Afar’s Kelbati Rasu/Zone 2.³ The United Nations secretary-general said on September 23 he was gravely concerned by the seizure and occupation of the three airports, intensified fighting around Tigray and the spread of hostilities into neighboring areas.⁴

In Amhara, ACLED reported clashes in Gazgibela in Wag Hemra and in Gidan, Lasta and Raya Kobo in North Wello. Those clashes involved federal forces, Tigray Peace Forces, Amhara riot police and militia against Tigrayan and Fano-aligned fighters.³ The Critical Threats Project said the Amhara front runs along the A2 highway between Alamata and Woldia, with rebel forces also attempting to push toward Sekota.⁶ The Guardian reported fighting around Weldiya and the suspension of flights to Lalibela because of nearby clashes, underscoring the threat to key Amhara corridors and symbolic sites.⁹

In Afar, the fighting threatens Ethiopia’s economic lifeline. ACLED recorded clashes around Abala, Megale, Wosema and Erebti on September 22. On September 27, it reported that Tigrayan forces appeared to control Erebti near the Tigray-Afar border.³ Africanews reported that Tigrayan-aligned forces had advanced in Afar, taking Erebti and pushing east in an apparent attempt to pressure routes toward Djibouti.² The Critical Threats Project assessed that the Afar axis could threaten the A1 Ethio-Djibouti highway, while noting that Djibouti handles more than 90 percent of Ethiopia’s imports and exports.⁶

Humanitarian warning signs return

The immediate humanitarian indicators resemble the early mechanics of the last Tigray catastrophe: severed communications, suspended flights, blocked roads, disrupted markets and evacuations of aid and official staff.

Reuters reported that internet and phone networks in Tigray remained disrupted for a fourth day on September 28. It also reported that the International Committee of the Red Cross evacuated 161 people from Mekelle to Afar’s capital, including African Union monitors, federal police, Ethiopian Airlines employees and Red Cross staff.¹ The Reporter Ethiopia said Ethiopian Airlines personnel were stranded in Tigray after flights to Mekelle, Axum and Shire were suspended from September 23, while evacuation planning focused on federal employees rather than airline staff.¹¹

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said land routes from Tigray to the rest of Ethiopia had been completely cut off, causing shortages of basic goods and services and subsequent price inflation.⁵ The Guardian reported panic buying, emptying shops and fears among residents of siege conditions similar to the previous war.⁹ Reuters added that Tigray had not recovered from the 2020-2022 war, that about 750,000 Tigrayans remained internally displaced as of February, and that the region was facing El Niño-linked drought.¹

Those conditions do not yet equal the full 2020-2022 collapse, when aid access, banking, transport and telecommunications were severely constrained and hundreds of thousands were pushed into famine-like conditions. But the direction is alarming. The UN called for safe and unhindered humanitarian access, protection of civilians and a return to talks under the Pretoria framework.⁴ The UK government condemned attacks in Afar and southern Tigray and the airport takeovers, warning that civilians must be protected and humanitarian workers safeguarded.⁷

Regional stakes

The crisis is also a regional security test because the fronts intersect with Ethiopia’s most sensitive corridors and external rivalries. The A2 highway links Addis Ababa to Tigray and onward toward Eritrea, while the fighting in Afar raises concern over routes toward Djibouti, Ethiopia’s main trade outlet.⁶ Reuters reported that Ethiopia’s military chief accused Eritrea, Sudan’s army and Egypt of backing opposition forces. Eritrea and Sudan’s army denied the allegations, while Egypt did not immediately respond.¹

The alliances have also shifted since the last war. Fano forces, which fought alongside the federal government against the TPLF during the 2020-2022 conflict, are now part of the new opposition coalition.¹⁰ The Guardian noted that the current fighting reflects those changed alignments and could destabilize a region already strained by Sudan’s war and Red Sea tensions.⁹

The central question is no longer simply who controls Alamata. It is whether the African Union and external partners can restore a minimum Pretoria process before the war logic hardens across Tigray, Amhara and Afar. If the airport seizures, road closures and communications blackout persist, northern Ethiopia’s battlefield could again become a humanitarian enclosure, with consequences reaching from Mekelle to the Djibouti corridor.