India rejects Pakistan-China boundary panel, exposing limits of Modi-Xi thaw

A new mechanism, an old objection

For India-China policy watchers, the dispute highlights a central tension in the current thaw. New Delhi may be willing to stabilize ties with Beijing after years of border friction, but it is not softening its objections to Chinese activity tied to Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Pakistan and China described the commission as a practical mechanism. Pakistan’s state news agency said the inaugural meeting formally launched a body envisaged under the 2013 China-Pakistan Agreement on Boundary Management System.⁴ Pakistan’s delegation was led by Bilal Mahmood Chaudhary, Director General for China at Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry. The Chinese side was led by Li Ya, Deputy Director General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Foreign Ministry.⁴

The meeting included officials from foreign affairs, defence, interior, commerce, communications, customs, survey and other boundary-management authorities. It covered cross-border coordination, movement of goods and people, joint border surveys and people-to-people links.⁴ Pakistan and China signed minutes at the end of the meeting and agreed to hold the next session in China on mutually convenient dates.⁷

Dawn reported that the commission stems from Article 45 of the 2013 boundary-management agreement. It is designed to oversee border-management arrangements, including boundary maintenance, inspections, marker issues, cross-border facilities and incident handling.⁶ The mechanism is separate from the demarcation commission created under the 1963 boundary agreement, whose work concluded after surveys, maps and boundary markers were completed.⁶

Why India objects

India’s objection is rooted in its position that Pakistan cannot enter into arrangements involving territory New Delhi claims as part of the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. The 1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, signed after the 1962 India-China war, involved the Trans-Karakoram Tract, including Shaksgam Valley. India claims the area, but Pakistan had controlled it before ceding it to China.³

The Indian Express reported that India has consistently held that Pakistan’s transfer of Shaksgam Valley to China was illegal and unacceptable.² The outlet’s backgrounder said the area spans more than 5,000 square kilometers and lies north of the Siachen glacier in the Hunza-Gilgit region.³

India’s criticism has also been tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Belt and Road-linked route connecting Kashgar in China with Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. New Delhi has long objected to CPEC because it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.³ Dawn reported that the new commission gives Islamabad and Beijing a regular coordination mechanism for a border central to movement through the Khunjerab crossing and to trade and connectivity linked to CPEC.⁶⁷

Reset under pressure

The timing gives the commission broader diplomatic significance. The Modi-Xi meeting at BRICS focused on stabilizing India-China ties, managing differences and preventing the boundary dispute from dominating the relationship.⁹ But the Pakistan-China move shows that New Delhi’s sovereignty concerns are not limited to the Line of Actual Control with China. They also extend to Beijing’s institutional cooperation with Islamabad in areas India claims.

Pakistan has cast the commission as an administrative and connectivity mechanism, not a reopening of the 1963 boundary settlement. Its Foreign Office said the body would support cooperation in border management, joint surveys, trade facilitation and people-to-people connectivity.¹ Pakistani state and media reports similarly emphasized practical coordination, future meetings and the commission’s link to the 2013 boundary-management framework.⁴⁷

That framing has not eased Indian opposition. New Delhi’s response indicates that any attempt by China and Pakistan to institutionalize border governance in contested areas will be treated as a challenge to India’s sovereignty claims, whether the mechanism is presented as technical, commercial or administrative.²⁸

The result is a narrow but important test for India-China normalization. Bilateral diplomacy may resume and summit language may improve, but third-country arrangements involving Pakistan-administered Kashmir remain a hard boundary for New Delhi.